The space of finite games can be decomposed into three orthogonal subspaces [2] , which are the subspaces of pure potential games, nonstrategic games, and pure harmonic games. The orthogonal projections onto these subspaces are represented as the Moore-Penrose inverses of the corresponding linear operators (i.e., matrices) [2], but no closed forms for these orthogonal projections are given. In this paper, in the framework of the semitensor product of matrices, we give explicit polynomial representation (actually closed forms) for these orthogonal projections.
Introduction
Rosenthal [1] initiates the concept of potential games, and proves that every potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium in 1973. Monderer and Shapley [3] systematically investigate potential games, give a method to verify whether a given game is potential. Intuitively speaking, a potential game is a game with a function from the set of strategy profiles to the set of real numbers satisfying that the deviation of every player's payoff caused by the deviation of this player's strategies is equal to that of the function also caused by the deviation of this player's strategies. Partially due to the fact that there is one common function describing the deviation of every player's payoff, potential games have been applied to many fields, e.g., traffic networks [15] [16] [17] , cooperative control [18] , optimization of distributed coverage of graphs [19] , and etc..
Although potential games possess so good properties and wide applications, there are other types of games that are not potential but still have good properties and potential applications. For example, the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is not potential, but has the uniformly mixed strategy profile as a mixed Nash equilibrium [2] . Hence it is necessary to give a systematic characterization for these finite games to investigate properties of other types of games and find their practical applications. When the number of players and the numbers of their strategies are fixed, Candogan et al. [2] identify the set of finite games with a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, and decompose this space into three orthogonal subspaces as follows: 
where these subspaces are the pure potential subspace P, the nonstrategic subspace N , and the pure harmonic sub-This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61603109), Natural Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province of China (LC2016023), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (HEUCFM170406). Proofs of this paper and related further results can be found in https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.08319. space H. It is also demonstrated in [2] that the pure potential subspace plus the nonstrategic subspace is the potential subspace, denoted as G P = P ⊕ N ; and the pure harmonic subspace plus the nonstrategic subspace is the harmonic subspace, denoted as G H = H ⊕ N . Nonstrategic games are such that every strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibirium. Harmonic games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria, but always have the uniformly mixed strategy profiles as mixed Nash equilibria. Candogan et al. [2] show orthogonal projections onto these subspaces by using the Moore-Penrose inverses of the corresponding linear operators (i.e., matrices), but do not show closed forms of these orthogonal projections.
It is important to obtain the closed forms of these orthogonal projections, because if they were obtained, one could verify whether a given finite game belongs to one of these subspaces, find an arbitrary finite game belonging to one of these subspaces no matter whether the number of players and the numbers of their strategies are given, and compute the orthogonal projections of finite games onto these subspaces very easily. As a consequence, more properties of these subspaces could be revealed. In this paper, we give closed (actually polynomial) forms for them (Theorem 5.1). Theorem 5.1 shows what these orthogonal projections explicitly are, i.e., formulae for these orthogonal projections as functions of the number of players and the numbers of their strategies. Hence no matter whether the number of players and the numbers of their strategies are given, one knows what these orthogonal projections are. In a companion paper [14] , bases of these subspaces are given, which can also be used to generate an arbitrary game belonging to one of these subspaces, and verify whether a given finite game belongs to one of them. However, using the result of [14] , if the number of players and the numbers of their strategies are not given, one cannot obtain these orthogonal projections. In this sense, the current paper is an essential improvement.
Our results are given in the framework of the semitensor product (STP) of matrices built by Cheng [12] , in which a linear equation (called potential equation) is proposed such that a finite game is potential iff the potential equation has a solution; and it is also proved that if the potential equa-Proceedings of the 36th Chinese Control Conference July 26-28, 2017, Dalian, China tion has a solution, then the potential function of the corresponding game can be computed from any solution. In [13] , a method based on the potential equation is given to verify whether a finite game is potential, and a closed form for the potential equation is given. In addition, the verification equations with the minimal number for checking a potential game are obtained. So the algorithms for verifying potential games in [13] have a lower computational complexity than the recent results in [14, 21, 22] and the current paper. However, orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games are are not discussed in [13] .
The STP of matrices is for the first time proposed by Cheng [9] . STP is a natural generalization of the conventional matrix product, and has been applied to many fields, e.g., analysis and control of Boolean control networks [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , control-theoretic problems [9] , symmetry of dynamical systems [10] , differential geometry and Lie algebras [11] , and etc.. Basic knowledge on STP is shown in Section 3.
The remainder parts of this paper are arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces necessary basic knowledge on finitedimensional Euclidean spaces. Section 3 introduces noncooperative strategic form finite games and their vector space structure in the framework of STP. Section 4 shows concepts of subspaces of these finite games. Section 5 shows the main contribution of this paper, polynomial representation for the orthogonal projections onto these subspaces. Some examples are also shown to demonstrate the advantage of our results. Section 6 is a short conclusion.
Preliminaries
In this section, necessary basic knowledge on Euclidean spaces are introduced. Notations are first shown as below.
Notations
• ∅: the empty set • 2 S : the power set of set S • |S|: the cardinality of set S • R: the set of real numbers • R m : the set of m-dimensional real column vector space • R m×n : the set of m × n real matrices • I n : the n × n identity matrix • δ i n : the i-th column of the identity matrix I n • Δ n : the set of columns of I n • [1, p] : the set of the first p positive integers
Euclidean spaces and orthogonality
In this paper, we consider the Euclidean space R m with the conventional inner product: for all x, y ∈ R m , x, y = x T y. Next we introduce some necessary preliminaries on orthogonality and projections. These results can be found in many textbooks in matrix theory, e.g., [20] . Two vectors x, y ∈ R m are called orthogonal, denoted by x⊥y, if x, y = 0. Two subspaces A, B ⊂ R m are called orthogonal, also denoted by A⊥B, if for all x ∈ A, all y ∈ B,
The following helpful proposition will be used in the main results.
Finite games and the semitensor product of matrices
A noncooperative strategic form finite game can be described as a triple (N, S, c),
Next we introduce the vector space structure of finite games based on the STP of matrices built in [12] . In this framework, payoffs can be represented as linear mapping forms, and all properties of finite games can be revealed intuitively from matrices. 
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional matrix product, and many properties of the conventional matrix product remain valid, e.g., associative law, distributive law, reverse-order law ((A B) T = B T A T ), etc.. Besides, for all x ∈ R t and A ∈ R m×n , it holds that x A = (I t ⊗ A)x. Throughout this paper, the default matrix product is STP, so the product of two arbitrary matrices is well defined, and the symbol is usually omitted.
For a finite game G = (N, S, c) with n players, for each player i, we identify his/her strategy j with δ j ki , denoted as j ∼ δ j ki , j = 1, . . . , k i , then S i is identified with Δ ki , i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that the payoffs can be expressed as
where x j ∈ S j ,x j ∈ Δ kj , and x j ∼x j , j = 1, . . . , n; then (V c i ) T ∈ R k is uniquely determined by c i , and called the structure vector of c i , hereinafter k := n i=1 k i . Define the structure vector of a game G by
where (V c i ) T is the structure vector of the ith player's payoff, i = 1, . . . , n. Then it is clear that the set G [n;k1,...,kn] of strategic form finite games such that each game of G [n;k1,...,kn] has n players, and the ith players of every two games of G [n;k1,...,kn] share the same strategy set of cardinality k i , i = 1, . . . , n, has a natural vector space structure as
That is, games of G [n;k1,...,kn] correspond to vectors of R nk .
Remark 3.1 Consider the Euclidean space R nk with the weighted inner product: for all x, y ∈ R nk , x, y Q := x T Qy, where Q ∈ R nk×nk is a positive definite symmetric matrix. In this paper, we consider the conventional inner product, that is, the case that Q = I nk . While the inner product considered in [2] satisfies
Hence the (pure) harmonic games considered in this paper are different from the ones considered in [2] .
Concepts of subspaces of finite games
In this section, we show basic concepts of subspaces of finite games.
Subspaces of nonstrategic games
Let us define some notations. Part of these notations for the first time appear in [12] .
Define
From the results in [2] , nonstrategic games are exactly the games such that the payoff of each player does not depend on the strategy played by the player himself/herself. Then their formal definition is obtained as below. 
In the framework of STP, Theorem 4.1 can be represented as the following Theorem 4.2. 
and satisfies
Next we characterize the projection of a game onto N . By Theorem 4.2, the following theorem holds. N is (N, S, c ) ,
Subspaces of potential games
In [3] , potential games are defined as the games (N, S, c) in G [n;k1,...,kn] satisfying
where φ is called potential function. The result of [3] shows that the difference of two potential functions of a potential game is a constant function. From this definition, nonstrategic games are exactly the potential games that have constant potential functions. For every nonstrategic game, every strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Necessary notations are given as follows. Regard 2 [1,n] as an index set, for all N s ⊂ [1, n],
Then
where
) . 1 Note that N = im(B N ) has already been shown in [14, Definition 3.4] , and (10) has been shown in [2, 14] . 2 The dimension has already been shown in [2, 3].
Subspaces of pure harmonic games
The following theorem follows from Theorem 4.4. 
where e 1 , . . . , e n are defined in (6) . 
Subspaces of pure potential games
Subspaces of harmonic games
The harmonic subspace is
and satisfies dim(G H ) = (n − 1)k + 1 5 .
Decomposition of subspaces of finite games
Theorem 4.11 Consider the finite game space G [n;k1,...,kn] . The pure potential subspace P, the nonstrategic subspace N and the pure harmonic subspace H satisfy that
..,kn] onto these three subspaces. Under the conventional inner product, P⊥N , P⊥H, N ⊥H.
Every game u ∈ G [n;k1,...,kn] has a unique direct-sum de-
Main results: polynomial representation for orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games
In this section, we show the main results of the present paper.
Polynomial representation for orthogonal projec-
tions onto subspaces of finite games Theorem 5.1 Consider the finite game space G [n;k1,...,kn] . The polynomial representation for orthogonal projections onto the pure potential subspace P, the nonstrategic subspace N , the pure harmonic subspace H, the potential subspace G P , the harmonic subspace G H are P N XP T N ,
respectively, where P N is defined in (19) , e i 's are defined in (6) , and
Next we give some illustrative examples to show the advantage of our results.
Illustrative examples
Example 5.2 [12, Example 26] Consider an arbitrary symmetric game with n = 3 and k 1 = k 2 = k 3 = 2. It is proved in [12] that such symmetric games are always potential via proving that the corresponding potential equations always have solutions. Next we show how to use Theorem 5.1 to verify this conclusion. The verification process of [12] is constructive. However our following verification process is mechanical, and hence can be finished by a computer program.
First, we obtain the orthogonal projection onto the subspace G P of potential games according to Theorem 5.1 as in Eqn. (25) .
Second, we verify whether such symmetric games G =  [a, b, b, d, c, e, e, f, a, b, c, e, b, d, e, f, a, c, b, e, b, e, d, f holds no matter what real numbers  a, b, c, d , e, f are. Hence such symmetric games are always potential.
Now it is known that every symmetric game with three players and two strategies is potential. Then is every finite symmetric game potential? Next we give a negative answer. b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, a, d, g, b, e, h, c, f, i] , where a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i ∈ R are arbitrary. By using Theorem 5.1, the orthogonal projection onto the potential subspace is shown in Eqn. (26) . Such games are potential iff
Besides, by Theorem 5.1, such games are pure harmonic iff (
Conclusions
In this paper, we mainly studied the orthogonal projections of finite game spaces onto the subspaces of pure potential games, nonstrategic games, pure harmonic games, potential games, and harmonic games. To the best of our knowledge, the following results were for the first time obtained in this paper: 1) Closed forms of the orthogonal projections onto these subspaces. 2) Making it symbolized to verify whether a finite game belongs to one of these subspaces.
The closed forms of the orthogonal projections onto these subspaces will be helpful in characterizing these subspaces, or how dynamic games belonging to one of these subspaces evolve. Related topics on dynamic games belonging to one of these subspaces are left for further study.
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